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Prediction versus Accommodation in Economics 
 
 
Abstract 
Should we insist on prediction, i.e. on correctly forecasting the future? Or can we rest content 
with accommodation, i.e. empirical success only with respect to the past? I apply general 
considerations about this issue to the case of economics. In particular, I examine various 
ways in which mere accommodation can be sufficient, in order to see whether those ways 
apply to economics. Two conclusions result. First, an entanglement thesis: the need for 
prediction is entangled with the methodological role of orthodox economic theory. Second, a 
conditional predictivism: if we are not committed to orthodox economic theory, then (often) 
we should demand prediction rather than accommodation – against most current practice. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to confirm a hypothesis, should we insist on prediction, i.e. correctly forecasting the 
future? Or can we rest content with accommodation, i.e. empirical success only with respect 
to the past? In this paper, I examine this issue in the context of economics. I will arrive at two 
main conclusions. The first is an entanglement thesis: the relative epistemic merit of 
prediction is entangled with the methodological role of orthodox economic theory. The 
second is a conditional predictivism, which fleshes out this entanglement: if we are not 
committed to orthodox economic theory, then (often) we should demand prediction rather 
than accommodation – against most current practice. 
 
To be clear from the start on terminology: first, in both philosophy and science, ‘prediction’ 
can refer to several different things: the empirical implications of a model or theory for past 
data, or for data not thought of by the modeler, or for any data not used in a model’s 
construction. In this paper, I will always mean the attempt to predict future data, and in 
particular will never use it to denote the accommodation of past data. I will also use the terms 
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‘prediction’ and ‘forecast’ interchangeably.1 Second, I will mean by ‘orthodoxy’ the 
neoclassical models that dominate mainstream economic theory, i.e. formal models that 
deduce the equilibrium outcomes of interactions between economically rational agents. 
 
To be clear from the start also on the paper’s scope: the aim is to bring to bear on economics 
general considerations about the relative epistemic merits of prediction and accommodation. I 
have in mind using prediction and accommodation for the purpose of confirmation, i.e. for 
testing a theory or model. This in turn has consequences for policy advice, since presumably 
such advice should be given on the basis of a correct model for the case at hand. I do not wish 
to imply the different claim that prediction is intrinsically a worthier goal than explanation. 
Finally, I will not discuss the fascinating but separate issue of what are the best ways actually 
to achieve successful predictions, nor how these ways relate to existing forecasting methods 
in economics and econometrics (Ericsson 2017, Tetlock and Gardner 2015, Northcott 2017). 
 
There is a considerable philosophy of science literature about prediction versus 
accommodation. The context for most of it has been the scientific realism debate: do we need 
successful predictions to justify claims that our theories are true, or are mere successful 
accommodations sufficient? Does it matter if the ‘predictions’ are of past data, so long as that 
data was unknown to the scientist when formulating their theory, or was not used in the 
theory’s construction? The literature’s focus has been on famous theories from physics and 
chemistry. But this paper’s focus is instead on economics and is primarily methodological: is 
prediction necessary for economics to be useful and to develop successfully? 
 
I begin by reviewing attitudes to prediction in economics, before discussing the general issue 
of when prediction should be favored. I then discuss one by one particular circumstances in 
which accommodation is endorsed, and thus in which prediction need not be insisted upon, 
considering each time whether that circumstance applies to economics. In light of this, I 
argue for an entanglement thesis, i.e. that the need or otherwise for prediction is not 
                                                 
1
 There is no uniform usage of these two terms across sciences anyway. In different cases, ‘prediction’ may 
denote any of: in-sample consequences of a model; extrapolation to new subjects; deterministic future 
earthquake claims; probabilistic future climate claims. Conversely, ‘forecast’ may denote respectively: forecasts 
strictly of future, out-of-sample data; forecasts, based on past data, only for known subjects; probabilistic future 
earthquake claims; deterministic future weather claims. 
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independent of our commitment or otherwise to methodological orthodoxy. The paper 
concludes by detailing exactly when we should be committed to prediction. 
 
2. Attitudes to prediction in economics 
A long tradition has doubted that systematic predictive success in economics (and social 
science more generally) is possible. Among the reasons: that economic systems are open, i.e. 
are chronically subject to significant influences from non-economic factors that are inevitably 
unmodeled; that economic systems exhibit reflexivity, i.e. that models themselves may 
influence their subject matter, thus creating a moving target2; or simply that there are usually 
too many significant variables interacting too complexly (Taylor 1971, Giddens 1976, 
Hacking 1995, Lawson 1997, MacIntyre 2007). According to Ludwig von Mises, 
“[predicting the economic future is] beyond the power of mortal man” (quoted in Rosenberg 
1993, 53). Other distinguished pessimists include Weber, Durkheim, Popper, Winch and, 
more recently, Daniel Hausman, Alexander Rosenberg, Daniel Little and Deirdre 
McCloskey. (Those more optimistic include Milton Friedman and Julian Reiss.)  
 
Such pessimism seems to be borne out in practice. Take GDP, for example: forecasts more 
than 18 months ahead fail to beat the naïve benchmark of assuming the same growth rate as 
today, and this weak predictive performance has not improved in 50 years (Betz 2006). 
Unemployment and inflation predictions fare little better. The situation is arguably even 
worse with respect to many financial variables. For instance, most studies confirm that 
forecasts of exchange rate movements cannot outperform the naïve benchmark of a random 
walk, and the same is true of stock market predictions too. 
 
In the face of this apparent impossibility, or at least great difficulty, of prediction, it has been 
argued that the goal of economics should instead be explanation.3 This methodological view 
stretches back to Mill, who argued (1843) that the ever-changing mix of causes in 
uncontrolled, field cases makes accurate prediction infeasible. As a result, theory should 
                                                 
2
 Arguably, the impossibility of accurate prediction implied by some rational expectations models can be 
thought of as a version of reflexivity. 
3
 W. G. Runciman: “The proper function of a social science … is not prediction but diagnosis” (1963, 17). 
Herbert Simon: “We should be wary of using prediction as a test of science, and especially of whether 
economics is a science, for an understanding of mechanisms does not guarantee predictability” (1989, 100). 
 4 
instead state core causal tendencies, such as human agents’ tendency to maximize their 
wealth. In any particular application, we may compose relevant tendencies in a deductive 
way and then add in as necessary local ‘disturbing causes’ – i.e. causal factors not captured 
by theory but that are also present. In this way, deductive theory is claimed to be more 
empirically fruitful than narrowly predictive alternatives because it offers generalizability – 
i.e. the prospect of empirical success in many applications by adding in different disturbing 
causes each time. 
 
Moreover, such Mill-type theorizing also offers the promise of understanding and insight. 
Indeed, these achievements are claimed to be superior to mere predictive success, even when 
the latter is possible. The reason is that what is of greater interest than predictive success in 
any particular case is knowledge of those factors or theoretical structures that generalize. It is 
the task of science, as a pursuit of systematic knowledge, to discover and isolate the latter. 
We might be interested in a particular structure of choices and incentives, such as, for 
instance, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, because we understand this structure, and the outcomes to 
be expected from it, in terms of the discipline’s fundamental building block of agent rational 
choice, and because we think it crops up in many different places. Therefore, rather than get 
lost in local detail, it is more fruitful to focus on the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure – even 
though it may predict accurately in hardly any particular cases. An analogy is with the 
methodological role of mechanisms in other sciences, such as neuroscience: explanation in 
neuroscience, many philosophers have persuasively argued, is via appeal to mechanisms that, 
analogously to the Prisoners’ Dilemma, are well understood and generalizable (Machamer et 
al. 2000 and many others). Accordingly, just as in neuroscience, it is knowledge of 
mechanisms that enables true explanation in economics, and our efforts should be directed 
accordingly. Moreover, it is knowledge of mechanisms that provides the understanding of 
any empirical success that we do achieve – and also provides understanding even in the many 
cases when our empirical success is imperfect.4  
 
                                                 
4
 Throughout, following Mill and the great majority of economists, I take economic theory to have a causal 
interpretation. Meanwhile, again following the relevant literature, I understand a ‘mechanism’ to be, roughly, an 
arrangement of entities related in such a way as to reliably produce particular effects. Accordingly, economic 
theory and mechanisms are conceived as playing similar roles. The paper’s main points, about prediction, are 
not sensitive to the distinction between them. 
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On this view, then, while generalizable predictive success would of course be highly 
desirable, because of such success’s infeasibility it is unfortunately best to abandon precise 
prediction as an epistemic goal.5 Economic practice has overwhelmingly followed Mill’s 
prescription and accordingly has de-emphasized prediction: “Forecasting has been regarded 
as the orphan of economics. Those who could do economics, did it; those who couldn’t do 
economics, forecasted.” (Ericsson 2017, 539) 
 
Yet there has also always been some implicit resistance to this anti-prediction view. Much of 
economists’ business is applied work, such as government or business consultancy, often 
involving cost-benefit and impact analyses. Much of this work is in turn forward-looking – in 
other words, implicitly or explicitly, it concerns prediction. This is not surprising, given the 
close relation between prediction and interventions and decision-making. 
 
Independently of this, there are also familiar pragmatic reasons for prioritizing prediction 
over accommodation. The Popperian virtue of falsifiability is much easier to apply to 
forward-looking prediction than to retrospective accommodation – as Popper himself 
emphasized. Similarly, the epistemic vice of confirmation bias, i.e. of disproportionately 
looking for or noticing supportive rather than disconfirming evidence regarding one’s own 
beliefs or theories, tends to be checked better by prediction than accommodation. So where 
does the balance lie? 
 
3. When should prediction be favored? 
Consider the kinds of explananda often faced by economists: Why did GDP grow by only 
0.3% this year? Why are wages in local restaurants lower than six months ago? Why did the 
dollar rise in value today? In such cases, there are typically many plausible after-the-fact 
explanations. Perhaps, for instance, the dollar rose because of increased expectation of a rise 
in interest rates, or because of good domestic manufacturing data, or because of political 
trouble in the country of a major foreign currency, or because of profit-taking by traders who 
                                                 
5
 There is a serious worry about whether the theory-first method in economics delivers enough empirical 
success – either prediction or accommodation – to warrant claims even of explanation (Alexandrova and 
Northcott 2009, Northcott and Alexandrova 2013). Moreover, the evidence for the Mill-type causal tendencies 
themselves is often shaky. In these respects, economics is crucially disanalogous to the exemplar of 
neuroscience. But the focus of this paper is elsewhere, so I will not discuss these familiar controversies here. 
 6 
had previously bid it down, or because it is regressing to its long-run equilibrium level given 
fundamentals, or because of some other unknown reason. The point is that many different 
plausible explanations are compatible with the same headline evidence, namely that the dollar 
rose. This multiplicity is helped by framing the explanandum qualitatively – we need to 
explain merely why the dollar rose without necessarily specifying by exactly how much. In 
contrast, typically there are only a few successful predictions. That is, whereas typically there 
are many plausible explanations after the fact, there are only few successful predictions 
beforehand. This lies at the heart of the intuitive case for prediction: it is better at filtering 
competing hypotheses.6  
 
Can this intuitive argument be made good on formally? Much work in philosophy of science 
has done just that. A core conclusion is the central importance of the likelihood ratio. In 
particular, for evidence E, hypothesis H and rival hypothesis H*, degree of confirmation is a 
positive function of the probability ratio p(E|H) / p(E|H*).7 In words, the key issue is how 
much the evidence discriminates for our hypothesis over salient alternatives. The heart of the 
intuitive case above is that successful prediction discriminates more. In the case of 
accommodation, there are many alternative hypotheses H* that (given their assumptions) 
entail E just as our hypothesis H does, so p(E|H) = p(E|H*) = 1, and H is not favored over the 
alternatives.8 But in the case of prediction, if no one else predicts successfully then p(E|H) > 
p(E|H*), and so this time the evidence does favor H over its rivals. 
 
This pro-prediction reasoning does not depend on knowing the mindset of a scientist, or on 
what the scientist might or might not have known when formulating their hypothesis, or on 
when relevant evidence was discovered, or on any other such historical factors. Nor does it 
rely on any a priori prejudice in favor of prediction, or on any appeal to prediction’s 
                                                 
6
 In statistical terminology, an advantage of prediction over accommodation is that it guards against overfitting. 
7
 Howson and Urbach (1993) and Worrall (2014), among others, give detailed Bayesian presentations. A similar 
conclusion can be reached in non-Bayesian ways too. 
8
 The hypotheses entail E because, in economics, results are typically deduced from a model’s assumptions. 
Thus, p(E|H) = p(E|H*) = 1. Whether a model’s assumptions themselves hold may of course be investigated in 
turn. Such supplementary investigation might reveal that p(E*|H) > p(E*|H*) with respect to new supplementary 
evidence E*. In this way, the evidential tie may be broken by supplementary investigation, which indeed is one 
route by which accommodation may be endorsed (section 6). 
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pragmatic advantages. Rather, it is based purely on a logic of confirmation that is itself 
neutral. How might this pro-prediction conclusion be blocked and thus accommodation 
defended? There are several ways. In the following sections, I consider each of them in turn. 
Which, if any, apply to economics? 
 
4. First defense of accommodation: No plausible alternatives 
Suppose there are no plausible alternative explanations. Then the mere fact of 
accommodation will be decisive. Take the German hyperinflation of 1923, for instance. This 
is explained by Germany’s rapid monetary expansion (relative to real production) in that 
year. Because there is no plausible alternative explanation of the hyperinflation, retrospective 
evidence is sufficient in this case. Formally, if E is the accommodated evidence, then in such 
cases p(E|H) > p(E|H*) for all salient H*, and thus accommodation confirms H. Intuitively, if 
no one else can accommodate the past evidence then the fact that you can tells strongly in 
your favor. This is accepted by almost everybody.9 
 
At first sight, this defense of accommodation will apply to economics only rarely. It is hard to 
prove this claim in a non-anecdotal way but, as we saw, it does seem that often in economics 
there are many plausible explanations after the fact. However, there is an important caveat: in 
economics, often the set of admissible hypotheses is severely restricted on non-evidential 
grounds. In particular, hypotheses must obey rational choice orthodoxy in order to be 
considered seriously. Because of this, the set of hypotheses consistent with the evidence may 
become much smaller – and small enough to vindicate accommodation after all. 
 
Here is an example to illustrate, taken from Julian Reiss (2008, 106-122). In a famous article, 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that money is the main cause of fluctuations in 
nominal income (1963). There exists statistical evidence for this claim. Friedman and 
                                                 
9
 Logically speaking, of course, there are always many hypotheses that can accommodate any given body of 
evidence – this is the familiar problem of under-determination. But methodologically speaking, the key issue is 
whether these alternatives, in addition to being logically possible, are also plausible or to be taken seriously. If 
not, then they are not of practical interest. (See also footnote 13.) Formally, in the Bayesian calculus this is 
reflected in the priors. Non-Bayesian approaches incorporate the same point in other ways; some, for instance, 
only define confirmation contrastively, i.e. as being a matter of evidence telling in favor of one theory over a 
particular alternative (Sober 1999). 
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Schwartz offered one explanation for it. In a more recent paper, Jess Benhabib and Roger 
Farmer (2000) offer an alternative explanation. Both of these explanations are consistent with 
the aggregate data, so at first glance there might seem to be an evidential tie.10 However, at 
one point Friedman and Schwartz’s model assumes that agents are subject to money illusion, 
thereby offending rational choice orthodoxy. Their model is also rather informal by modern 
standards. Benhabib and Farmer’s model, by contrast, satisfies orthodox desiderata much 
better: it is presented mathematically, it features agents maximizing formally specified utility 
functions given the structure of incentives facing them, and the outcomes are equilibria of 
those agents’ utility maximizations. This in turn is why Benhabib and Farmer’s paper is 
celebrated: it is the only postulated explanation of the aggregate data that also satisfies 
orthodox methodological desiderata. This is no mean intellectual achievement – so far no one 
else has emulated it. But note that the preference for Benhabib and Farmer’s model is not 
motivated by its empirical superiority, because both of the candidate explanations 
accommodate the macroeconomic data equally well. Indeed, Benhabib and Farmer’s model is 
arguably worse off with respect to accommodating other empirical data, given that more of 
its assumptions are highly idealized and thus false, such as that the economy comprises many 
identical representative households all of which rationally maximize the same utility 
function, and so on. Rather, Benhabib and Farmer’s model is preferred because of a non-
empirical constraint on admissible hypotheses. 
 
If we accept this non-empirical admissibility constraint, there is (currently) no alternative to 
the Benhabib and Farmer model. Therefore, their model is favored merely by accommodating 
the aggregate money and nominal income data. Formally, for E = the money-nominal income 
data and H = the Benhabib-Farmer model, while there may be many inadmissible H* (such as 
Friedman and Schwartz’s model) for which p(E|H) = p(E|H*), for all admissible H* we have 
p(E|H) > p(E|H*). 
 
                                                 
10
 Friedman and Schwartz do appeal to supplementary evidence in addition to the basic money-income 
aggregates, in effect utilizing the ‘additional evidence’ defense of accommodation discussed below (section 6). 
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I do not adjudicate here the controversial – but separate – issue of whether this admissibility 
constraint is itself defensible.11 Rightly or wrongly, endorsement of the constraint is 
widespread in the profession, even among those sensitive to methodological reflection 
(Rodrik 2015). I also do not address here exactly how often there are no plausible alternatives 
even once given the admissibility constraint. No doubt this will vary case by case. The point 
here is rather the entanglement of prediction with methodological orthodoxy: the more that a 
commitment to orthodoxy whittles down the number of plausible alternatives, the more that 
accommodation will be sufficient for confirmation. 
 
Conclusion: accommodation is vindicated only if we accept that we should be constrained by 
modelling orthodoxy (or at least this is the tendency).12 
 
5. Second defense of accommodation: Calibration 
Suppose that a hypothesis is already accepted by all and the remaining task is only to 
calibrate it. Then accommodation can again be epistemically sufficient. For example, 
suppose we wish to know the mass of a newly discovered moon of Jupiter. We can calculate 
this by observing closely the motion of nearby objects. The underlying theory of gravity is 
not in question; rather, it is just a matter of using it to identify by observation the correct 
value for the new moon’s mass. That is, a theory may leave a parameter value still 
unidentified and past evidence then be used to identify it. Accommodation is perfectly 
sufficient for such calibration. 
 
Formally, the admissible hypothesis space is now different calibrations of the same 
underlying theory. H and H* are particular such calibrations, and E is the evidence used to 
calibrate. The condition p(E|H) > p(E|H*) can then adjudicate the competition between 
different calibrations. When the inequality holds, it means that H is the particular calibration 
supported by E – and this inequality often will hold perfectly well even if E is past evidence, 
                                                 
11
 My own view is that it is not (Northcott forthcoming). I also do not discuss here whether it is defensible to 
focus purely on accommodation of the headline macroeconomic correlation rather than on the other empirical 
data contradicted by the orthodox model’s assumptions. 
12
 In principle, some commitment other than to orthodoxy could also severely constrain the range of admissible 
hypotheses, thereby creating its own opening for accommodation. But in practice, orthodoxy is the only current 
candidate for this role. 
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i.e. if it is a case merely of accommodation. But, as is widely noted in the literature, such 
calibration does not provide any support for the underlying theory relative to other underlying 
theories (Worrall 2014, 56-57; Howson and Urbach 1993, 410-411). 
 
Some empirical methods in economics are exercises in just such calibration. Benhabib and 
Farmer’s paper is in part an example (see below). Other examples include the measurement 
of monetary velocity by assuming Fisher’s equation of exchange, and much work in the real 
business cycles and econophysics literatures. However, in all of these cases it is 
controversial, to say the least, whether the underlying theory being calibrated should indeed 
be accepted. 
 
Ultimately, the calibration defense of accommodation is a subset of the no-plausible-
alternatives defense. Before, accommodation could (sometimes) be endorsed if we accepted 
an orthodoxy constraint on models’ admissibility. Now, in the calibration case, the constraint 
is in effect even stronger – the only admissible hypotheses are different calibrations of the 
same underlying model. 
 
6. Third defense of accommodation: Additional evidence 
There may be many different explanations for why, say, wages in local restaurants are lower 
than six months ago. Suppose that they all successfully accommodate the past data of the 
wage decrease. However, there may also be additional historical evidence available that 
favors one of these explanations over the others. If so, there is no need to rely on prediction 
to break the tie. Perhaps, for instance, it is discovered that an especially generous owner of a 
chain of local restaurants recently retired and that their successor offered only much lower 
wages to new staff, and further that this new evidence supports one explanation over the 
others. Formally, there would then be additional evidence E* that breaks the tie between H 
and H*, i.e. for which p(E*|H) > p(E*|H*).13 
 
Usually, gathering additional evidence is indeed possible. It is what historians do all the time 
– not coincidentally, it is thus a central way in which accommodation may be endorsed, 
                                                 
13
 This can be seen as an instance of the general point that empirical equivalence does not imply epistemic 
parity between hypotheses once we consider asymmetric empirical support for each hypothesis’s background 
assumptions (Laudan and Leplin 1991). 
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although I am not aware of any systematic attempt to connect this to the role of prediction in 
economics. The significant issue for us is how this interacts with the role of theory. Such 
additional evidence is typically idiographic. That is, it tends to highlight sui generis local 
causes. The explanations that result thus tend not to be those offered by theory, because 
theory by its very nature focuses instead on systematic causes that recur across contexts. 
 
Turn now to economics. Orthodox economic models outline the actions that should be 
expected from economic agents in particular situations. They are usually given a causal 
interpretation and these causes, at least to some extent, are taken to apply across contexts. 
Accordingly, orthodox models typically do not capture every idiosyncratic local cause, and 
do not aim to. Indeed, as per Mill’s original methodological program, such models’ utility is 
in part precisely that they don’t capture every local cause – it is this that enables them to be 
applied to many contexts, adding in different disturbing causes each time. 
 
This mismatch between orthodox models and sui generis local explanations is not 
controversial. The point here is how it bears on the need for prediction. We saw previously 
that a way accommodation can be endorsed is by excluding unorthodox alternatives. But now 
accommodation can be endorsed only by including them, i.e. by appealing to explanations 
that incorporate sui generis – and thus usually unorthodox – local causes. So, the pattern is 
reversed. The same commitment to orthodoxy that favored the first two ways of supporting 
accommodation will now tend to rule out this third way of supporting it. 
 
7. Fourth defense of accommodation: Experimental control 
Suppose that our evidence E is obtained from a controlled experiment. Such experiments are 
situations deliberately engineered to decide between competing hypotheses H and H* by 
shielding the phenomenon at hand from confounding background factors. Similar remarks 
apply to trials: samples are divided randomly between treatment and control groups, again 
with the aim of ensuring that there are no systematic confounds, thus ensuring that no salient 
alternative to H can explain any difference between the results in the two groups. 
Accommodation in such circumstances is quite sufficient. Formally, for evidence E collected 
in a successful controlled experiment, regardless of whether it is prediction or 
accommodation, p(E|H) > p(E|H*). But the relevance of experiments to prediction in 
economics does not seem to have been much discussed. 
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In economics, as in many other social sciences, experiments are difficult to conduct. 
Compared to laboratory sciences, often there are insuperable practical and ethical barriers. 
How might we test experimentally, for example, Friedman and Schwartz’s hypothesis that 
money causes nominal income? We can hardly commandeer two real economies, equalize all 
relevant background factors, shield these economies from any disturbing causes, and then run 
different monetary policies on each.  
 
Nevertheless, economists have been able to utilize a range of methods to replicate the 
inferential conditions of experiments as often as possible. One such method is natural 
experiments, i.e. when processes outside the investigator’s control happen to divide a sample 
into treatment and control groups in the same way as a random assignment would have. A 
second method is the quasi-experiment, i.e. (typically) when an investigator controls the 
assignment of subjects to a treatment group but using some criterion other than random 
assignment. A third method is the field trial, i.e. when a controlled experiment is carried out 
‘in the field’, for instance when different villages are randomly assigned to either treatment or 
control groups for some social policy intervention (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). A fourth 
method, finally, is the laboratory experiment itself (Kagel and Roth 2016). 
 
These different methods have various strengths and weaknesses. One shared difficulty 
remains range of applicability: practical and ethical limitations mean there is only a limited 
range of economic questions that experiments can usefully elucidate. A second shared 
difficulty is external validity: will results from one context extrapolate to that of another? In 
the case of laboratory experiments, is agent behavior in the laboratory a reliable guide to 
agent behavior in often very different and more complex circumstances in the field (Levitt 
and List 2007)? 
 
In contrast to the previous three defenses of accommodation, the experimental defense holds 
regardless of whether we are committed to orthodoxy. Still, although there may thus be no 
connection in terms of epistemic logic, in practice there has been a positive correlation 
between heterodoxy and use of experimental approaches (section 9). 
 
8. Accommodation and entanglement 
The issue of prediction versus accommodation in economics is thus deeply entangled with 
methodological orthodoxy. If we insist on orthodoxy, it becomes more likely that two of the 
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first three defenses of accommodation apply: the no-plausible-alternatives justification and 
the calibration justification. On the other hand, the contextual, historian’s additional-evidence 
justification typically will not apply. If we do not insist on orthodoxy, on the other hand, the 
situation is reversed: now neither the no-plausible-alternatives nor the calibration justification 
is likely to apply, but the contextual, historian’s justification may well do. What are some of 
the implications of this? 
 
Several methods of accommodation are common in economics. Among them are regression 
analyses that retrospectively calibrate a model or that test a model’s degree of fit with the 
data. The problem in the first case is that the particular model must already be assumed true 
but that this assumption will rarely be justified. The problem in the second case is that it must 
be assumed that no other model can achieve a similar degree of fit with the data, and this 
assumption too may be implausible without an orthodoxy constraint (or even with one) – and 
especially so because typically the fit with data in such cases is imperfect and so it is all the 
more difficult to rule out that alternatives may fit equally well. The conclusion is that such 
regressions are more likely to lose epistemic force without an additional commitment to 
orthodox models only. 
 
Similar remarks apply to more sophisticated accommodation methods too. To illustrate, 
return to the example of Benhabib and Farmer’s (2000) model of how money causes nominal 
income. Their empirical work proceeds in several steps. The first step is calibration – using 
past data to estimate the values of various model parameters. The second step is simulation – 
shocks, themselves calibrated from actual data, are fed into the calibrated model to generate 
simulated data. The third step is then an assessment of the degree of fit between the simulated 
data and the corresponding actual data. This assessment is itself a complex process, involving 
several regressions, but the eventual verdict is somewhat informal, the authors concluding 
(544): “The main finding from the comparison of these two sets of figures is the broad 
similarity in the qualitative and quantitative nature of the responses of the model economy 
with that of the data.” Overall, the empirical method used is a blend of various forms of 
accommodation. 
 
In their discussion, the criticisms that Benhabib and Farmer consider necessary to address are 
either internal technical ones, such as how to derive determinate empirical implications from 
a model with multiple equilibria, or else are empirical ones but only in a rather stylized and 
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informal sense, such as the worry that the degree of increasing returns to scale that needs to 
be assumed is implausible. Their solution to the latter issue is to avoid the awkward empirical 
implication in the first place by supplementing the model with a representation of how agents 
form beliefs – without any detailed empirical justification for this new theoretical 
supplement. 
 
Benhabib and Farmer thus implicitly assume that their model needs defense only from 
criticisms within orthodoxy. No defense is thought necessary against heterodox alternatives 
such as Friedman and Schwartz’s original explanation – and so no argument is offered that 
their model fits the data better than do heterodox alternatives. Indeed, tellingly, there is not a 
single reference to Friedman and Schwartz in the entire paper, even though Friedman and 
Schwartz were addressing exactly the same economic explanandum, namely why changes in 
money supply cause changes in income. In effect, Benhabib and Farmer assume that because 
there are currently no orthodox alternatives to their model, therefore there are no alternatives 
at all. This is an example of the orthodox admissibility constraint in action. Not surprisingly, 
this constraint is paired with an empirical concern exclusively with accommodation rather 
than prediction. 
 
This example is arguably typical, in two ways: first, accommodations of one kind or another 
are the pre-eminent empirical method; and second, only orthodox alternatives are 
considered.14 
 
9. Implications for the heterodox 
What if we are not committed to orthodoxy? Begin by briefly surveying how often this is 
actually the case. Following the Cowles Commission after the war, there was a strong norm 
across the profession that econometrics should aim at testing particular theoretical models 
rather than at discovering more fragmented or a-theoretical causal relations (Malinvaud 
1988). Although later empirical methods deviated from many of the details of the Cowles 
Commission’s approach, this focus on theory was retained. Such work is typically committed 
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 In this particular example, it is notable that the accommodation of both the headline aggregate data and the 
data justifying particular assumptions, is rather informal and casual. In other orthodox examples, 
accommodation of the headline data (although not of particular assumptions) is often more precise. 
 
 15 
to orthodox modelling and also is a species of accommodation rather than prediction. But 
more recently, empirical work has less often been theory-based. Biddle and Hamermesh 
(2016) report that whereas in the 1970s all microeconomic empirical papers in the 
profession’s five most prestigious journals exhibited a theoretical framework, in the 2000s 
there was a resurgence of a-theoretical studies.15 Moreover, citation numbers suggest that the 
a-theoretical work is at least as influential. Angrist and Pischke (2010) also report the rise of 
a-theoretical practice in several subfields. Such a-theoretical work typically tests for causal 
relations between variables using one of the variety of experimental techniques described 
earlier, and is not committed to orthodoxy. Accordingly, overall the commitment to 
orthodoxy in empirical work in economics seems to be decreasing, albeit from a high base.16 
 
This paper’s analysis suggests that rejection of a commitment to orthodoxy tends to 
undermine the epistemic credentials of accommodation, leaving us with only three empirical 
methods, all currently minority ones: experiments, prediction and idiographic historical 
analysis. Of these three, experiments are often not available. So, if we give up on prediction 
too, then (often) economics can only be an idiographic, historical science. This would make it 
difficult for economics to advise policymakers or other decision-makers about interventions, 
except when experiments are available.17  
 
There is a caveat: perhaps it is possible sometimes to justify policy-relevant predictions 
without any prior predictive success but instead purely by means of local knowledge, and in 
particular by detailed knowledge of current conditions and local causes. For example, 
perhaps local knowledge may justify the prediction that a particular free trade treaty will 
increase two countries’ GDPs – because we can know that the classic factor model for the 
benefits of free trade will indeed operate and in addition know that this operation will not be 
                                                 
15
 It is true that there has always been empirical work in economics not committed to orthodoxy, in fields such 
as agricultural and labor economics and in activities such as national accounting and cost-benefit analyses. 
Nevertheless, empirical work not committed to orthodoxy is now at a minimum more prestigious (Cherrier 
2016). 
16
 In tandem, the reliance on experimental methods is increasing. I do not have figures for the proportions of 
empirical work that are calibration of an agreed model, idiographic historical analysis, or prediction. 
17
 Arguably, giving up on prediction would also mean giving up on the important benefit of forcing economic 
modelling to become more empirically responsive. But that is a separate matter, touching again on the issue of 
whether we should indeed commit to orthodoxy. 
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outweighed or disturbed by other factors. In principle, this is a way to warrant predictions, 
and thus to offer policy usefulness, without actual predictive success. How often will it work 
in practice? Ultimately, that is an empirical question, but prima facie the record does not 
seem hopeful – systematic predictive success at the policy level via such methods, from 
either historians or economists, is hard to find, perhaps precisely because of the ubiquity of 
unpredicted disturbing causes. Accordingly, unless there is a record of actual predictive 
success, I think we should be suspicious of claims that some predictions are justified. 
Admittedly, the prospects might be brighter at a humbler level than national policy because 
the likely number of disturbing causes might be much lower. Perhaps, for example, local 
knowledge might indeed justify a prediction that decreasing a concert’s ticket price will 
increase attendance. But even here our confidence would be much greater if there was a local 
history of successful predictions about attendance. 
 
10. Conclusion 
Predictive success is hard to achieve in economics and generally it has not been seen as a 
priority. But if there are many possible explanations of a given event, and if there is no 
supplementary investigation of local details, then predictive success is necessary for 
confirming models and, thus, for policy usefulness. An exception is if decisive experimental 
evidence is available – but usually it is not. Accordingly, prediction should be required 
uncomfortably often. 
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